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WHOM DO YOU TRUST? A Reply to Prof. Kahn 
Concerning the Knight Case, also known as Rudkin 
Trust 
By Stephen B. Cohen 
Tax Notes, Vol. 125, Nov. 9, 2009 
Georgetown Law School Working Paper 
 
In his 2008 opinion in Knight v. Commissioner,1 Chief Justice 
John Roberts harshly criticized then Court of Appeals Judge Sonia 
Sotomayor.  Although Roberts affirmed the result of her second 
circuit opinion in the case,2 he wrote that her approach to the Internal 
Revenue Code “flies in the face of the statute.”  In the August 3 issue 
of Tax Notes, I argued that Roberts’ criticism of Sotomayor was 
“logically flawed and unwarranted.”3  In the September 21 issue of 
Tax Notes, Prof. Douglas Kahn defended Robert’s criticism of 
                                       
1 552 U.S. 181 (2008), Doc. 2008-948, 2008 TNT 12-6. 
2 The name of the case before the second circuit was William L. 
Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner. 
3 “Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s Tax Opinions,” Tax Notes, Aug. 3, 2009, 
p.474, Doc. 2009-15953, 2009 TNT 146-12. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502687
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Sotomayor as “persuasive and accurate” and attacked Sotomayor’s 
opinion in the case and my defense of what she wrote.4  For the 
reasons explained below, I believe that Prof. Kahn’s arguments are 
contestable and perhaps even untenable.  
The Knight case involved Section 67(e)(1), which limits the 
deduction of “costs which are paid or incurred in connection with the 
administration of [an] estate or trust and which would not have been 
incurred if the property were not held in such estate or trust.”  The 
issue was whether Section 67(e)(1) applies to a trust’s expenses for 
investment advice.   
Roberts construed the statute by reading the word “customarily” 
into the second clause of Section 67(e)(1).  According to Roberts, 
Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs would not customarily have been 
incurred if the property were not held in trust.   
On the other hand, Sotomayor interpreted the statute to mean 
that Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs could not have been incurred 
if the property were not held in trust.  In effect, she read the statute as 
saying that Section 67(e)(1) applies if the costs would not ever have 
                                       
4 “Rudkin Testamentary Trust – A Response to Prof. Cohen,” Tax 
Notes, Sept. 21, 2009, p. 1263. 
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been incurred if the property were not held in trust.  In effect, she 
read the word “ever” rather than the word “customarily” into the 
statute.   
Roberts observed—and Prof. Kahn agreed—that Congress 
might have substituted the word “could” for the word “ would” in the 
statute but did not.  Moreover, Roberts noted that the word “could” is, 
as he put it, “highly accessible.”  Therefore, he concluded, 
Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1) must be incorrect.    
Of course, Congress might also have included the word 
“customarily” in the statute but did not.  Nevertheless, both Roberts 
and Kahn apparently believe that the failure to include “customarily” 
does not mean that Roberts’ reading is incorrect even though the 
failure to substitute “could” for “would” does mean that Sotomayor’s 
reading is wrong.  Perhaps both Roberts and Prof. Kahn would 
explain that the word “could” is more “accessible” to legislators than 
the word “customarily.”  Therefore, the failure to substitute “could” for 
“would” is more meaningful than the failure to insert the word 
“customarily.” 
Even so, the use of “would” instead of “could” does not 
necessarily mean that Congress rejected Sotomayor’s reading 
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Section 67(e)(1).  It might signify a lack of consciousness about the 
ambiguity inherent in the statute as written.  Or it might reflect a 
legislative decision not to resolve this ambiguity and instead to allow 
courts to determine more specifically how to apply the language.  The 
logical mistake of both Roberts and Kahn is assuming that a failure to 
resolve the ambiguity through the use of the word “could” in place of 
“would” necessarily implies a resolution of the ambiguity in one way 
rather than another.   
More generally, suppose that a statute in question is 
ambiguous and could be read to mean either A or B.  A decision by 
Congress not to modify the language so that it clearly means A does 
not necessarily imply that Congress means B. 
Roberts also argued—and again Prof. Kahn agreed—that 
Judge Sotomayor’s reading of the second clause in Section 67(e)(1) 
would make the first clause superfluous.  Roberts’ opinion stated: 
If the only costs that are fully deductible are those that 
could not be incurred outside the trust context-that is, that 
could only be incurred by trusts-then there would be no 
reason to place the further condition on full deductibility 
that the costs be “paid or incurred in connection with the 
administration of the . . . trust,”§ 67(e)(1). We can think of 
no expense that could be incurred exclusively by a trust 
but would nevertheless not be “paid or incurred in 
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connection with” its administration.5  
 
In my August 3 article, I argued that this criticism misread the 
statutory scheme: 
Section 67(e) divides all trust deductions into two 
categories: (1) deductions for costs incurred in connection 
with the administration of a trust; and (2) the standard 
deduction and deductions for distributions to trust 
beneficiaries.  Section 67(e)(1) requires that deductions in 
the first category (that is, deductions incurred in 
connection with the administration of a trust) “would not 
have been incurred if the property were not held in such 
trust.”  Section 67(e)(2), in contrast, does not impose 
such a “would not have been incurred” requirement for 
either the standard deduction or distributions to trust 
beneficiaries.  Thus, the purpose of the “paid or incurred 
in connection with the administration of [a] trust” language 
in the first clause of Section 67(e)(1) is to separate 
deductions subject to the “would not have been incurred” 
requirement from specified deductions under Section 
67(e)(2) that are not subject to that requirement. 
 
Prof. Kahn argued that I am mistaken because the limit on 
deductions under Section 67(e)(1) applies only to “costs.”  The 
standard deduction and distributions to trust beneficiaries, he 
continued, are not “costs in any sense” and therefore could never be 
thought to be subject to the Section 67(e)(1) limits.   
                                       
5 552 U.S. 181, ___, 128 S. Ct. 788. 
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A trust, however, might pay the expenses of its beneficiaries, 
for example, for education or travel.  These expenses would be, in 
common parlance, costs incurred by the trust.  They would not, 
however, be costs incurred in the administration of trust property as 
such and therefore should be fully deductible without limit.  Thus, the 
first clause in Section 67(e)(1) is not rendered superfluous by 
Sotomayor’s reading of the statute.  It is needed to confine the limits 
on deductibility to administrative costs and to insure, for example, that 
the trust’s payment of expenses of a beneficiary are fully deductible. 
There is one other aspect of Prof. Kahn’s article that I find 
puzzling.  I cited, as significant, the fact that both the Treasury and 
the Solicitor General endorsed Sotomayor’s reading of Section 
67(e)(1).  Prof. Kahn wrote: 
Cohen’s view that approval of a court’s 
holding by the winning party demonstrates the 
validity of that holding is extraordinary to the 
point of being bizarre.  
 
 Is it sensible, however, to equate the position taken by the 
Treasury and the Solicitor General as no different from that of any 
self-interested private litigant?  The Treasury has a special interest in 
the fair and effective administration of the tax laws.  The Solicitor 
General has an obligation, not just to try to win, but to pursue the fair 
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and effective application of the U.S. Code.  Surely their endorsement 
cannot be dismissed as if they were private litigants with only private 
interests to pursue.  Surely their endorsement supports the judgment 
that Sotomayor’s approach did not, as Roberts’ claimed, “fly in the 
face of the statute.” 
For these reasons, I remain convinced that there are at least 
two plausible interpretations of Section 67(e)(1) and that Roberts was 
therefore wrong when he claimed that Sotomayor’s reading “flies in 
the face of the statute.”  Moreover, while either interpretation may be 
plausible, Sotomayor’s makes it easier to administer the admittedly 
cumbersome and awkward language of the statute.  It is easier to 
determine whether a cost could not have been incurred than whether 
it would not customarily have been incurred.  For reasons of 
administrative feasibility, therefore, I prefer Sotomayor’s approach.   
Prof. Kahn, on the other hand, prefers Roberts’ interpretation 
because it would narrow the range of trust expenses to which Section 
67(e)(1) would apply.  This preference for Roberts’ approach 
emanates from the fact that Prof. Kahn finds the Section 67(e)(1) 
limits on deducting trust administrative costs to be wrong as a matter 
of tax policy.   
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On this question of tax policy, I fully agree.  In order to produce 
a true income figure, the administrative costs of a trust should be fully 
deductible without limit.  Section 67(e)(1) therefore ought to be 
repealed.  Disagreement with the policy or purpose of a statute, 
however, is not a proper ground for interpreting the language of the 
statute to limit its scope. 
Prof. Kahn goes even further, suggesting that the courts should 
have interpreted Section 67(e)(1), notwithstanding its language, to 
permit a deduction in full for trust expenses for investment advice.6  I 
am unsure how he would square that position on statutory 
interpretation – which seems clearly to “fly in the face of the statute” – 
with his disdain for Sotomayor’s reading of Section 67(e)(1).   
                                       
6 “Rudkin Testamentary Trust – A Response to Prof. Cohen,” Tax 
Notes, Sept. 21, 2009, p. 1263, at p. 1266. 
 
